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People tend to cooperate with and defer future decisions to authorities when those
people perceive the authorities as fair (Tyler, 2003). In the current experiment, the
effects of expert witness type (adversarial, neutral court appointed, biased court
appointed) and class of defendant (individual, corporation, government agency) on
perceived fairness were explored. Participants were given a pre-trial questionnaire to
control for the trial experience, provided with a court transcript, and then filled out a
post-trial questionnaire composed of procedural justice evaluations. Neutral observers
rated cases with adversarial testimony as more procedurally fair than cases with court
appointed testimony, and found cases against corporations to be more procedurally fair
than cases against government entities. As hypothesized, perceived fairness judgments
were lowest when the plaintiff lost to more "powerful" entities and when the loss was
coupled with testimony by court appointed expert witnesses. The present research
continues to highlight the concern about the use of court appointed experts in the
courtroom.
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The American legal system is a complex entity that attempts to govern the
behavior of those living under its rule. Given that most people seem to be law-abiding
citizens, the system appears to be relatively successful. But what factors entice someone
to obey the law when no authority is watching, to involve and cooperate with authorities
when one has a complaint, and to trust the possibly expensive and tedious process of
litigation to justly solve a problem? According to the notion of procedural justice, a key
factor shaping the behavior of the public in dealing with authorities and the legal system
is the fairness of the processes used (Tyler, 2003). There are other factors that may also
be influential, including the perceived risk of being caught and punished, the successful
performance of authorities in the apprehension and prosecution of criminals, and the
perception of equal treatment across communities (Tyler, 2003). However, these factors
are less predictive of future cooperation with legal authorities than procedural fairness
(Tyler, 2003).
In the courtroom, there are numerous variables that could impact how fair
people rate the proceedings. One such variable is the type of expert witness used to
present evidence to the judge and/or jury. Expert witnesses playa growing role in
litigation, as many types of cases require some sort of expert knowledge to be
considered in determining the verdict - for example, medical malpractice suits in which
the jury must be educated about biochemical interactions resulting from a possibly
dangerous combination of medications (Gross, 1991). Psychological research has begun
to look at the effects of using the standard party-appointed experts (adversarial experts)
versus court appointed experts on the perceived fairness of the legal system (see
Johnstone, 1996). The current study continues this line of research with an added
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consideration of the role of the defendant, defined by whether an individual plaintiff is
suing another individual, a corporation, or the government. This exploration of the
effects of expert witness type and role of the defendant on evaluations of procedural
justice will provide insight as to the best use of expert witnesses in the courtroom,
depending on the trial scenario, in order to maximize perceptions of fairness in the legal
system.
Procedural Justice, Fairness, and Motive-Based Trust
The idea of procedural fairness is part of the concept of procedural justice. The
term "procedural justice" was first used in 1975 in social psychology, referring to the
consequences of variation in procedures (Lind & Tyler, 1988). A strong emphasis was
on the perceived fairness of procedures, which shifted the focus from the outcome to the
process. So instead of researchers concerning themselves solely with whether people
believed that the verdict of a trial or interaction with a police officer was fair, the
fairness of the procedures used to reach the verdict came under consideration. The
general finding in the field since incorporating the procedural element is that it is the
fairness of the procedures used that increases people's willingness to cooperate with and
defer to legal authorities, more so than the perceived fairness of the actual outcome
(Tyler, 2001). It is important to emphasize that, when an individual believes authorities
are using fair procedures, that individual is more willing to accept the decisions of those
authorities even upon receiving an unfavorable outcome than if the individual did not
believe fair procedures were being used.
It is necessary to explore the concept of fairness to understand what qualities it
encompasses in procedural justice and how it is measured in psychological research.
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Researchers consider two manifestations of the fairness concept: the quality of
decision making by the authorities, and the quality of interpersonal treatment received
from the authorities by those involved in the legal system (Tyler, 2003). People feel that
decision making is fair when it has features of neutrality, consistency, openness and
objectivity, and when decisions are clearly explained. Positive evaluations of the quality
of interpersonal treatment are based on people feeling like they are treated with respect
and dignity, and that the authorities care about their concerns and recognize their rights
(Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2001). These two components of fairness, the quality of decision
making and of interpersonal treatment, are two primary aspects that comprise
procedural justice models and are generally accepted in the research field.
Occasionally included as an aspect of the quality of treatment, but more
generally accepted as a consequence of the quality of decision making and interpersonal
treatment, is motive-based trust (Tyler & Buo, 2002). Motive-based trust is based on
inferences about another's character and motives (Tyler & Buo, 2002). Tyler and Buo
(2002) concluded that people are more willing to allow authorities to make decisions
when those people trust the motives of those making the decisions. They provide
extensive empirical support for the procedural justice hypothesis, finding that both
procedural justice judgments and evaluations of motive-based trust are more important
factors than outcome-based evaluations when it comes to decision acceptance (Tyler &
Buo, 2002). For example, Tyler and Buo (2002) compared social motives (procedural
justice and motive-based trust judgments) to instrumental motives (ratings on the
favorability and fairness of the particular outcome), and found that 44% of the variance
in the willingness to accept legal decisions is based on social motives, with only 1%
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based on instrumental motives. In other words, 44% of the variation in people's
responses can be attributed to procedural justice and motive-based trust judgments,
whereas only 1% of the variation in people's responses can be attributed to evaluations
based on outcome. This particular finding is illustrative of the weight people put on
process-based judgments as opposed to outcome-based judgments.
Why is Procedural Justice Important? Questions ofLegitimacy
Tyler and Huo (2002) define legitimacy as the belief that authorities are entitled
to be obeyed and that therefore people should defer judgments and decisions to those
authorities. In a way, legitimacy is a value, motivating people to cooperate with and
trust in an institution. It is this notion that allows the legal system in the United States to
function as it does, for it would be impossible to employ enough police to watch the
move of every inhabitant (who would, without faith in the system, have no reason to
follow it) and enforce every law, and the courts would backlog if the state attempted to
prosecute all subsequent wrong-doings. When the legal system and those authorities
that operate within it are perceived to be legitimate, a self-regulating society is possible
(Tyler, 2003). This self-regulating society is generally a law-abiding one, with citizens
who have personal morals that mesh with the socially presented norms of acceptable
behavior (Tyler, 2003). When individuals feel that the legal system reflects their own
notions of justice and morality, those individuals will be more willing to let the
authorities deal with legal matters, and because those individuals hold themselves to a
personal standard of behavior, they in turn follow accepted laws. Of course, not
everyone agrees with all the laws or the outcomes of legal disputes, but research
suggests that when people receive bad outcomes they are less likely to react negatively
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if those people view the authority that delivered that outcome as legitimate, or if they
felt there was procedural justice (Tyler, 2006). Speaking simply, when the procedures
are perceived to be legitimate, people are less likely to interpret the actions and
outcomes of the legal system as unfair.
Legitimacy is recursive. People who find authorities to be more legitimate tend
to find the procedures used by those authorities as more fair, and the belief that
authorities use fair procedures leads to people perceiving those authorities as more
legitimate (Tyler, 2006). In a courtroom, for example, legitimacy is strengthened
through procedural justice (when people believe fair procedures are used), and the use
of rational approaches to decision making (including scientific and technological means
which reflect neutrality and the use of facts) (Tyler, 2006). Once authorities are
perceived to be legitimate, people are more likely to accept their decisions and defer
future decisions to them (Tyler, 2006). When people disagree with a decision or believe
the decision to be unfair within a system perceived as legitimate, they are more likely to
make external attributions rather than internal attributions (Tyler, 2006). For example,
in a study that partially addressed the perceived control over a plaintiffs win or loss in
the courtroom, Johnstone (1996) noted that the plaintiff did not rate his or her ability to
affect the outcome higher after a win or loss; rather, the success was attributed to the
lawyer. To analyze this finding in terms of legitimacy, it would be reasonable to
hypothesize that had the plaintiff lost in a system perceived as legitimate, the loss would
be attributed to the actions of the lawyer (as Johnstone (1996) states). Whereas in a
system perceived as illegitimate, the plaintiff would attribute the loss to a faulty and
unfair system, with the consequences of this attribution highlighting the focal concern
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of legitimacy and the legal system: if people do not believe a system is legitimate, they
will be unlikely to defer decisions to and trust in the authorities that compose the
system, and when such a system is responsible for controlling the behavior of the
masses, the downside to a loss of legitimacy is often based in fear of anarchy and chaos
(Tyler, 2006).
Legitimacy in the Courtroom: Admission ofEvidence and Expert Testimony
Current literature emphasizes a focus on procedural justice models, including
motive-based trust, instead of a focus on the instrumental aspects of the legal system.
The next step is for the legal system to take psychological research into consideration. It
is a good sign for the legal system that individuals do not tend to disregard court
verdicts when a ruling seems unfair, but the knowledge that process is more important
than outcome in regard to decision acceptance is not the end of the road. Instead, it is up
to procedural justice research to determine how to best increase the perceived fairness
and trustworthiness of motives in police and courtroom procedures so as to boost the
overall legitimacy of the legal system, thus contributing to a self-regulating society that
voluntarily defers legal decisions to proper authorities.
One area of concern involving procedural justice and legitimacy revolves around
expert witness testimony in the courtroom. Case law, in conjunction with the Federal
Rules of Evidence (FRE), has established standards for the presentation of expert
evidence. This evidence is generally accepted as "scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge" that is "beyond the ken of the average layman" (FRE 702; Dyas
v. US, 1977). When such evidence is deemed necessary to assist the judge and/or jury in
their decision making, a qualified witness is allowed to testify about the topic (FRE
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702). This qualified expert witness is different from the common lay witness in a
number of ways. The lay witness is traditionally a stranger to both parties, has
testimony available to both sides, can be subpoenaed to testify, and is extremely limited
to what s/he can offer as testimony (Gross, 1991). What can be presented as testimony
is related to the issue of opinion, and is the key difference between lay and expert
witnesses.
Lay witnesses can only offer testimony that is based on the perception of the
witness and helpful for a clear understanding or the determination of fact (FRE 701).
Experts, on the other hand, "create new evidence in the form of expert opinions"
(Gross, 1991, p. 1140). This leaves the decision of what resources to consult and what
methodology and studies to consider up to the witness (Gross, 1991). The lawyer,
fighting to win the case, is put in charge of the selection, preparation, and presentation
ofthe hired expert witness, resulting in anything but neutrality, thoroughness, and
clarity (Gross, 1991). In fact, it is the lawyer who provides much ofthe information on
which the expert is to base an opinion (Gross, 1991). The logical solution to the
problems stemming from the partisan selection of expert witnesses is to have the court
appoint neutral expert witnesses, either in place of or in combination with the
adversarial expert witnesses (Gross, 2001).
There is no question that the use of adversarial expert witnesses is widespread.
In a survey of California State Superior Court civil jury trials, Gross (1991) found that
experts testified in 86% of cases, with an average of 3.3 experts per trial. More
importantly, in 63% of all trials there were experts testifying on both sides, creating a
courtroom "battle of the experts" that is left to the jury to resolve (Gross, 1991; Milich,
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1994). Finally, almost 60% of the expert witnesses who testified had testified
previously in similar cases at least twice over a six-year period (Gross, 1991). This
raises the concern of "professional witnesses," who are those experts trained to testify
by lawyers on a particular issue to the extent that they have perfected their courtroom
performance, exercising credentials and authority to the point where they are hard to
discredit (Gross, 1991). This might not sound like a problem until one considers that
credentials are not synonymous with the ability to accurately and thoroughly inform
others on a critical issue, and that looking the part and maintaining composure under
cross-examination does not mean that the analysis of the information presented is of the
highest quality (Gross, 1991). In fact, the entire adversarial process often deters well-
informed experts from participating in cases, because they do not wish to deal with
misplaced criticism and scrutiny focused on, say, the expert's medical school transcript
instead of the scientific information being presented in regard to the case (Gross, 1991).
With adversarial experts, lawyers try to select those who will be frrm and
convincing in their points, train with them extensively before the trial, and decide, to an
extent, what evidence the expert is provided on which to base his/her professional
opinions (Milich, 1994; Gross, 1991). For example, lawyers may give an expert certain
documents on which the expert is to base an opinion, but leave out additional evidence
that might lead the expert to draw a different conclusion (Gross, 1991). The additional
evidence could then be presented by a different expert, restricting cross-examination by
the opposing party that could be detrimental to a winning verdict (Gross, 1991). The
process of cooperation between the lawyers and experts inevitably develops into a
partisan relationship between the parties, resulting in a biased expert (Gross, 1991). In
..
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addition, there is always the advantage of one party having superior resources, in the
form of time and money, to invest in the often costly selection, preparation, and
presentation of experts (Gross, 1991). If fairness is determined by neutrality,
consistency, openness, objectivity, and the clarity of decisions, the current procedures
involving adversaria1 expert witnesses should raise significant alarm. A proposed
solution to increasing procedural justice evaluations and maintaining the perceived
legitimacy of the functioning courtroom involves the use of court appointed expert
witnesses.
To address the practical disadvantages of adversaria1 expert witnesses, both
Milich (1994) and Gross (1991) advocate for the use of court appointed experts, whose
purpose is to present a neutral review of applicable research and scientific opinion. The
foundation in the legal system to use court appointed experts is in place, and the
demand has existed for over a century (FRE 706; Gross 1991). So why are court
appointed expert witnesses so rarely used in practice? Gross (1991) points to trial
lawyers as the primary reason, claiming that lawyers are at the forefront of the
adversaria1 system and their organized opposition is strong. Opponents argue that court
appointed experts have too much power, which in tum compromises the supposedly
impartial role of the judge, and that a court appointed expert will take the constitutional
right to a jury decision away from the parties, because the jury will be compelled to
accept the testimony at face value (Gross, 1991). Gross (1991) believes that these
arguments are unfounded, noting that court appointed experts should be given more
weight because they are neutral, and that research suggests juries will continue to ring
in verdicts counter to the testimony of court appointed experts when they deem it to be
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appropriate. For example, when a court appointed medical expert testified in a comt
case that went to verdict, the jury agreed with the court appointed expert in 15 cases but
reached a verdict that was not consistent with the expert's opinion in 9 cases (Myers,
1965). In this particular report, the jury came to a conclusion different from the court
appointed expert over one third of the time, demonstrating that a jury will not blindly
adhere to the verdict of the expert without their own evaluation of the case.
Gross (1991) goes on to explain the numerous benefits of court appointed
experts, including the avoidance of the dreaded battle of the experts. The battle of the
experts is a result of the selection and preparation methods of adversarial experts, and
results in the magnification of areas of disagreement, and the obfuscation of common
ground, in the area of expert knowledge (Gross, 1991). Court appointed experts have
the potential to help avoid this issue, because they would have the opportunity to clarify
any disagreements in the field. He also points out the lack of incentive for the court
appointed expert to butt heads with the attorney during cross-examination, because the
questioning would not be viewed as an attack on credentials or personality but rather on
the limits of the expert's opinion. The purpose of expert testimony should not be to
mislead and confuse the jury, but rather to provide a neutral and accurate base of
specialized knowledge for the jury to use in reaching a verdict. Eighty-seven percent of
federal district court judges surveyed believed that court appointed experts are likely to
be helpful in certain cases, yet over 75% of those same judges had never bothered
appointing expert witnesses themselves (Gross, 1991). Current research involving
proceduraljustice and legitimacy might provide the push needed to increase the use of
court appointed experts in the courtroom.
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Current Psychological Research Addressing Expert Witness Testimony
Kaiser (1994) surveyed university students and a sample of the general public to
gain insight into whether the subjects - potential jurors - felt expert testimony was a
valid component of the legal system, and whether experts should be appointed by the
parties or by the courts. The results suggest that expert testimony can be a necessary
aspect of a trial "to see that justice is served" (Kaiser, 1994, p. 26). The subjects also
believed that court appointed experts are more likely to be non-biased than adversarial
experts. But do these findings hold up in practice? The responses in Kaiser's (1994)
study were not given from the point of view of those actually involved in legal
proceedings. Johnstone (1996), in two studies examining the effects of expert type,
verdict, and perspective on procedural justice judgments, addresses the relevant issues
in Kaiser's survey and sets the foundation for the current study.
In the first study conducted by Johnstone (1996), university students read an
abridged civil court case transcript either from the viewpoint of the plaintiff or a neutral
observer. The transcript had testimony from either two court appointed experts or two
opposing adversarial experts, and the outcome for the plaintiff was varied. Subjects then
provided ratings of outcome and procedural fairness, perceived control, perceptions of
the expert witnesses and judge, and other related measures. Johnstone (1996) had
hypothesized that participants would find adversarial experts to be fairer than court
appointed experts, whereas neutral observers would prefer court appointed experts.
Results suggest that the plaintiffs actually felt trials with court appointed experts were
as fair as trials with adversarial experts, but that those plaintiffs believed the court
appointed experts were more biased than adversarial experts. Neutral observers also
..,
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rated court appointed experts as more biased than adversarial experts. This finding
runs counter to the Kaiser (1994) results, where respondents viewed court appointed
experts as more likely to be non-biased. Despite rating one type of expert as more
biased than another type, neither perspective condition showed a preference for an
expert type. Johnstone (1996) ran a follow-up study to examine this finding.
The significant change in Study 2 was the use of one court appointed expert for
testimony, but in three conditions: a court appointed expert with, a) testimony biased
towards the plaintiff, b) testimony biased towards the defendant, and c) neutral
testimony. This sort of testimony resembles real-life courtroom situations much more
than the testimony of Study 1. The adversarial condition was identical to Study 1.
Johnstone (1996) findings suggest that the use of a court appointed expert can lead to
lower perceived fairness ratings when the plaintiff loses from the perspective of a
subject role-playing the plaintiff- a clear example of procedural justice concerns voiced
by Tyler. From a neutral observer perspective, court appointed experts were rated as
less biased than adversarial experts. Neutral observers were better at distinguishing
between outcome fairness and procedural fairness, but results still tended to be messy
(Johnstone, 1996). Basically, people do not like to hear verdicts counter to what they
desire, and the addition of court appointed testimony might complicate such situations.
The findings of Johnstone (1996) are discouraging in the sense that court
appointed expert testimony continues to appear problematic in regard to procedural
justice judgments made by those involved in litigation. Other variables need to be
uncovered to provide more information about circumstances in which the use of court
appointed experts might be better received by participants in the legal system. In the
iIf cacs:q
14
Johnstone (1996) studies, only one courtroom situation was used - a civil case in
which an individual was suing a company. This is only one example of an individual
interacting with a defendant within the courtroom. It is reasonable to assume that
judgments of motives, relating to Tyler and Huo's (2002) motive-based trust, could vary
depending on whether an individual was in a civil case against another individual, a
corporation, or the government. Across these instances, the use of court appointed
experts might carry different weight, especially in regard to outcome. For example, a
loss for a plaintiff in an individual v. individual civil case where the testimony of a
court appointed expert played a key role might have a different effect on procedural
justice evaluations than if that court appointed expert played a strong part in a favorable
outcome for a corporation, or even more so, for the government. This is because the
plaintiff may feel that the motives of those more strongly associated with the body of
the court, in this case, the motives of the court appointed experts in conditions where
expert testimony favors the defense, are untrustworthy. This effect is likely to increase
as the plaintiff loses to more and more "powerful" entities (the corporation and the
government).
To test these hypotheses, the current experiment will manipulate the role of the
defendant and expert witness conditions. Three types of defendants will be used to
explore the impact of the role of the defendant on procedural justice and motive-based
trust evaluations: an individual plaintiff v. an individual defendant, individual v.
corporation, and individual v. government. Three expert witness conditions are
designed to study the interaction between the role of the defendant and expert witness
..,
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testimony: adversarial testimony, court appointed testimony that is neutral, and court
appointed testimony that is biased in favor of the defense.
The strictly adversarial condition will consist of two expert witnesses, one
appointed by each party and with testimony favorable to the side that hired the expert.
The two court appointed expert conditions will also feature adversarial expert
testimony, which is consistent with the use of court appointed experts in the real world.
The addition of court appointed expert witness testimony to adversarial testimony is not
only realistic, but it is also the most frequently suggested reform in the matter of expert
witness testimony (Gross, 1991). In the neutral court appointed condition, the court
appointed expert will provide background testimony to supplement the adversarial
expert testimony, but the testimony of the court appointed expert will not favor one side
or the other. However, in the biased court appointed expert condition the testimony of
the court appointed expert favors the defense, with the plaintiff-appointed adversarial
expert providing the only testimony supporting a win for the plaintiff. The biased court
appointed expert condition represents the worst-case scenario for the plaintiff, and
results from this particular condition may be the most dramatic in regard to procedural
justice evaluations.
Methodology
Subjects
Subjects consisted of 97 University of Oregon college students (53 female)
participating in Human Subject Pool research. Subjects ranged in age from 18-24
(M=19.26) and were 84.21% European American, 8.42% Hispanic American, 5.26%
Asian American, and 2.11 % other. Subjects were compensated one credit (equal to one
...
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hour of time) for completion of the study to put towards introductory psychology
class requirements and were run in groups ranging from 1-9 participants. Two subjects
were excluded to due their failure to complete the entire pre-trial questionnaire (above
numbers reflect descriptive statistics after exclusion).
Materials and Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of 9 conditions based on two variables:
role of defendant (individual v. individual, individual v. corporation, individual v.
government), and type of expert witnesses used (adversarial only, neutral court
appointed with adversarial, biased court appointed with adversarial). Subjects filled out
a pre-trial questionnaire (Appendix B) designed to control for any effects of the trial
experience and to be used as a comparison with the post-trial questionnaire. The pre-
trial questionnaire posed questions regarding perceived fairness of the legal system and
its participants, and perceived control over trial proceedings.
Following completion of the pre-trial questiolmaire, subjects were provided with
an abridged transcript of a civil court case (Appendix D) that included opening and
closing statements made by the parties and testimony from expert witnesses. The trial
transcript detailed a case held constant in all aspects except for the role of the defendant
and type of expert testimony. The role of the defendant was played by a doctor, a
private medical group, or a government healthcare agency. The court case involved a
plaintiff who suffered a heart attack, purportedly due to the combination of prescribed
arthritis medication and a previously documented condition of angina (chest pain).
Expert witness testimony addressed background information necessary to understand
the prescribed medication and relevant issues pertaining to the likelihood that the
... !!f!!i
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arthritis medication, in combination with the angina, led to the plaintiff s heart attack.
The defendant was being accused of malpractice due to the prescription of a drug,
known to increase the risk of heart attack, to a patient with a history of angina. Subjects
were instructed to read the trial transcript as though they were playing the role of a
neutral observer. The verdict of the case was held constant, with the plaintifflosing the
civil case in all conditions.
Following the perusal of the transcript, subjects filled out a post-trial
questionnaire (Appendix C). The questionnaire included basic demographic factors
(age, sex, race/ethnicity) and evaluations of procedural and outcome fairness, motive-
based trust, perceived control, and reflections on the expert witnesses.
At the end of the study, subjects were debriefed as to the purpose of the
experiment and had an opportunity to ask questions.
Data Analysis
Data were primarily analyzed using contrast coded variables and regression
analyses, unless otherwise specified. Two regression models were run for each research
question, when applicable: a smaller model to test for main effects across conditions
and a larger model to test for interactions.
Results and Discussion
Procedural Fairness Ratings and Expert Type
The general findings of procedural fairness ratings support earlier results found
by Johnstone (1996) and continue to highlight the concern about the use of court
appointed experts in the courtroom. Subjects who read the transcript with only
adversarial testimony rated the trial procedures higher in faimessthan subjects whose
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adversarial testimony was accompanied by court appointed testimony. This finding
approached significance (t(95) =1.750, p=.083) and was present regardless of the type
of court appointed testimony, as no significant difference existed between the
procedural fairness ratings between the neutral and biased court appointed conditions
(t(95)=.293, p=.771, n.s.). Pre-trial procedural justice ratings were controlled for in the
regression analyses, and remained a significant predictor of post-trial procedural justice
ratings (t(95)=2.670, p<.OI).
The persistence of this effect is worrisome. "Fairness" is defined by the quality
of decision making, including aspects of neutrality, consistency, openness, and
objectivity, along with the quality of interpersonal treatment (Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2001).
By this definition, court appointed expert witnesses should be favored, as they
theoretically possess these traits to a greater degree than experts prepared by the parties'
lawyers. If the type of expert witness were seen to possess traits that align with the
definition of fairness used to evaluate procedural justice, the use of such an expert type
would be hypothesized to increase fairness ratings in trial proceedings. Either the
subjects in the current study did not rate the court appointed experts more favorably in
evaluations of degree of bias, suggesting that the court appointed experts used were not
considered neutral and objective, or despite high ratings in this category the subjects felt
proceedings were more fair with solely adversarial testimony. If the former outcome is
the case, there is a fundamental issue in regard to displaying the court appointed expert
in a positive and fair light. This would need to be addressed before court appointed
experts would be beneficial in the courtroom in regard to improving evaluations of
procedural justice. If the latter is the case, and neutral observers still prefer strictly
If -
19
adversarial testimony despite the perception of court appointed experts as possessing
qualities related to fairness, then the induction of court appointed experts in mainstream
litigation will continue to be problematic until other factors are explored to mitigate this
discrepancy.
An examination of bias ratings of the court appointed and adversarial experts
showed that the biased court appointed expert was rated more biased than the neutral
court appointed expert (t(62)=2.601, p<.05), demonstrating that subjects recognized that
the expert intended to be more biased was, in fact, more biased. Subjects found the
adversarial expert witness for both the defense and the prosecution to be equally biased
regardless of the role of the defendant or whether or not a court appointed expert
testified as well. The court appointed expert bias ratings were averaged to provide a
more realistic measure of perceived bias, as court appointed experts may be relatively
neutral in some cases but are likely to be more obviously biased towards one side in
general (due to the nature of the evidence) (MCourtAppointed=5.l05, see table 1.0 for
individual means). Including the more extreme biased expert mean allows for a better
representation of the "worst case scenario" for neutral observer ratings of bias, as
testimony was notably skewed towards the defense. The aggregated court appointed
expert bias ratings were compared with the adversarial experts' bias ratings using a
within-subjects general linear model.
Adversarial expert witnesses were rated as significantly more biased than court
appointed experts, even with the inclusion of the biased court appointed expert rating
(F(l,58)=52.049, p<.OOl). This is the logical finding, as adversarial experts are selected
and prepared for testimony by a lawyer, the result of which is unavoidably a partisan
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relationship (Gross, 1991). Though a logical finding, these results illustrate that
despite neutral observers being cognizant of the biases of expert witnesses, those
observers still prefer the "somewhat biased" adversarial experts to "neither biased nor
unbiased" court appointed ones.
Procedural Fairness Ratings and Role ofthe Defendant
It was previously hypothesized that as a plaintiff loses to entities that hold
greater levels of power, procedural justice evaluations will decline. For example, an
individual plaintiff losing to another individual will result in higher procedural justice
evaluations than a plaintiff losing to a corporation, or even more so, a government
agency. This hypothesis was partially supported in the current experiment, with
increased fairness ratings in the individual v. corporation condition compared with the
individual v. government condition (t(95)=-2.213, p<.05). This suggests that although
subjects did not provide significantly different ratings in the individual v. individual
condition compared with the other two conditions (t(95)=.178, p=.859, n.s.), subjects
found cases in which the plaintiff lost to a corporation to be significantly more
procedurally fair than when the plaintiff lost the same case to a government agency.
Procedural fairness ratings may be lower for the government condition because
individuals may associate government agencies in general with the government-run
court system. In the case of a loss, subjects may have a difficult time separating the
victorious government-affiliated defendant from the government system running the
courts, thus rating procedural fairness lower than if the defendant were a corporation,
another individual, etc.
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Recoding the contrast variables so as to compare the individual and
corporation condition resulted in nonsignificant findings (t(95)=.968, p=.336, n.s.),
suggesting no difference in procedural fairness ratings when the defendant is an
individual compared with when the individual is a corporation. One significant finding
after recoding was lower procedural fairness ratings in the government condition
compared with the average of the other two conditions (t(95)=-2.023, p<.05). Though
comparing results across the original and recoded model may result in reanalyzing
variance, which is an important factor to consider when interpreting results, these
findings do reinforce the original model that demonstrates differences only between the
corporation and government conditions.
One possibility for the lack of significant differences in procedural fairness
ratings between the individual condition and the other two relates to verbal feedback
from subjects after the early stages of running the experiment. Though not officially
measured through questionnaires or statistically analyzed, a number of subjects reported
that they did not feel the individual being sued in the individual condition should be
held responsible in that particular case. If this feeling was widespread, it may have
resulted in procedural fairness ratings reflecting not only responses about the treatment
of the plaintiff, but about the entire case scenario as well. This could pose a problem
with between group comparisons if similar sentiments were not held about the
corporation and government conditions.
The use of court appointed experts in higher conditions of defendant power
tends to exacerbate the loss of the plaintiff in the eyes of a neutral observer, as reflected
in procedural fairness judgments. This effect is the strongest in the difference between
OJ
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the neutral court appointed expert and biased court appointed expert conditions in the
individual condition compared with the corporation and government conditions. In
other words, an interaction exists where procedural fairness ratings are lower in the
neutral court appointed condition compared with the biased court appointed condition
when the plaintiff is against an individual as opposed to another category of defendant
(t(95)=2.689, p<.Ol). The mean rating of the individual condition in which a neutral
court appointed expert testified (M=6.00, SD=1.789) does not follow the trends of both
decreasing means with the addition of court appointed testimony and decreasing means
with the increase in power from individual to government (see table 2.0). This may be
the result of the previously discussed distorted fairness ratings based on a defendant
whom subjects believed should not be the target of the lawsuit.
The Procedural Justice Effect
The underlying concept of procedural justice is that it is the fairness of the
procedures used that increase people's willingness to work within a system, and this
procedural fairness is more predictive of cooperativeness than how fair people perceive
particular outcomes to be (Tyler, 2001). In the current experiment, subj ects posing as
neutral observers rated procedural fairness highest when only adversarial testimony was
present in the courtroom, and lowest when the defendant was affiliated with the
government. To examine how this particular experiment fits the framework of
procedural justice, a series of regression analyses were run to understand the effects
outcome fairness and procedural fairness have on the willingness to deter future
problems to the legal system.
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The post-trial questionnaire item referring to the plaintiffs willingness to
defer future problems to the legal system was used as the core dependent measure, as
the deterrence of problems and willingness to cooperate with proper authorities is a
common measure of procedural justice (see Tyler, 2003). Outcome fairness was the
only significant predictor of the two (t(94)=3.106, p<.01), suggesting that outcome
fairness is a better predictor of future deterrence than procedural fairness. However,
procedural fairness and outcome fairness are highly positively correlated with each
other (r=.691, p<.001, N=95), and both are significantly positively correlated with the
outcome variable (rOutcomeFaimess=.363, p<.001; rProceduralFaimess=.212, p<.05). Therefore,
people who tend to think the outcome is fair, think the procedures are fair, and are likely
to deter future problems to proper authorities, and the same goes for the opposite
scenario. This makes differentiating the two effects complicated and an issue that
cannot be solved with the current data. Had the verdict been manipulated, as in
Johnstone (1996), the effect of procedural fairness could have been teased out. Future
research may consider including verdict manipulation to avoid similar complications.
It is important to note the wording of the questionnaire item in combination with
the role being played by subjects. Subjects were instructed to read the transcript as
though they were a neutral observer attending the trial, whereas the questionnaire item
asked the neutral observers to rate the likelihood that the plaintiff would deter future
decisions to the legal system. The neutral observers are making a judgment as to
whether or not the party involved will continue to work within the legal system in the
future - not whether they themselves would deter future decisions based on this trial
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experience. However, the procedural justice effect can be further explored in the
current data set by looking at legal system fairness.
A series of regression analyses were performed to examine the greater question
of the role of outcome and procedural fairness on neutral observers' judgments of legal
system fairness. An initial model with pre-trial evaluations of procedural fairness and
legal system fairness as predictors for post-trial legal system fairness accounted for a
significant amount of variance (R2=.262 (adjusted), F change (2,93)=17.826, p<.OOl).
As to be expected, neutral observers' pre-trial system fairness ratings were a significant
predictor (t(94)=3.667, p<.OOl), suggesting that previous impressions of the fairness of
the legal system strongly predict impressions of legal system fairness after the trial
experience. Pre-trial procedural fairness ratings approached significance (t(94)=1.673),
p=.098, n.s.).
Adding outcome fairness ratings to the model resulted in a significant leap in
variance explained (R2 change=.367, F change (3,92)=94.980, p<.OOl), bringing the
model up from .262 to .636 (R2 adjusted values). Outcome fairness ratings are a strong
predictor oflegal system fairness for neutral observers (t(94)=9.746, p<.OOl). The
addition of post-trial procedural fairness to the model is not significant (R2
change=.OOl, F change (4,91)=.255, p=.615, n.s.). This suggests that the perceived
fairness of a particular outcome within the legal system is going to have a significant
effect on a neutral observer's overall perception of the legal system, even when that
outcome does not directly affect the observer (as in the current experiment). This effect
seems to be a very powerful and immediateone, whereas procedural fairness may have
a more gradual effect. A negative verdict may ignite strong emotional responses, which
......--
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could account for the immediate dramatic effect outcome has on fairness ratings.
Though outcome does seem to drive ratings of post-trial legal system fairness, fair
procedures may be subtly contributing to greater feelings of legal system legitimacy and
fairness.
Outcome Fairness Ratings, Expert Type, and Role ofthe Defendant
No significant main effects in outcome fairness ratings existed across expert
type or role of the defendant. However, the same significant interaction was present
involving the difference between the neutral court appointed expert and biased court
appointed expert conditions in the individual condition compared with the corporation
and government conditions (t(95)=2.161, p<.05). The mean rating in the neutral court
appointed condition where the defendant is another individual is 5.90 (SD=2.514; see
table 3.0) -like the procedural fairness ratings, a mean strikingly lower than the other
expert conditions with an individual defendant.
This finding is difficult to interpret considering the otherwise predictable trends
in the data. However, an explanation does exist if in fact the majority of subjects felt
that the individual (a doctor) should not have been sued. Reasons vocalized for this
sentiment in post-experiment discussions include the belief that the doctor was just
doing his job, bad things can happen but may be products of [necessary] risks in the
medical field, and that the drug manufacturing and distributing company should be
targeted instead.
The adversarial testimony ratings for outcome fairness (M=6.91, SD=.831) and
procedural fairness (M=7.64, SD=.674) in the individual condition set the hypothesized
trends for the rest of the data, suggesting that those ratings may be seriously considered
--------------------------- ._------
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even if the subject feels the doctor should not be the defendant. The court system is
designed to try those suspect of crimes, and occasionally those suspect are not guilty -
courtroom procedures are intended to identify these individuals as well as the guilty
ones. These adversarial ratings should not necessarily be affected, especially if the
outcome is in favor of the doctor, because then those who do not think the doctor should
be tried end up with a relatively fair verdict.
In the biased court appointed expert ratings for the individual condition, the
outcome faimess (M=7.45, SD=1.753) and procedural faimess (M=7.64, SD=1.326)
logic is similar to the adversarial ratings. If the subjects believe the doctor should not be
sued, then having an expert biased in favor of the defense with a verdict ultimately in
favor of the defense may actually increase the faimess ratings.
The low means in the neutral court appointed testimony (MOutcome=5.90,
MProcedural=6.00) might represent the danger of court appointed testimony when neutral
observers feel that the defendant is wrongly accused. Johnstone (1996) and the current
study found decreased faimess ratings when court appointed testimony was given
compared with strictly adversarial testimony, partially explaining the low faimess
ratings due to the sheer presence of court appointed testimony. In the Johnstone (1996)
study, neutral observers rated fairness measures lower after a loss than after a win when
the court appointed expert was biased in favor of the losing party. In the current
experiment, the court appointed testimony is biased in favor of the defendant in one
expert condition. In this case the defendant turns out to be the winning party, but what
would the ramifications have been had the plaintiff been victorious? Court appointed
testimony will in reality often favor one side over the other, because evidence in general
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may favor one side over the other. If neutral observers follow court proceedings in
which a party loses despite expert evidence presented in its favor, fairness ratings would
likely drop below even those seen in relation to the mere presence of court appointed
testimony. Scenarios where parties are falsely accused or convicted with varying
degrees of evidence against them do occur in the legal system, and naturally would be
hypothesized to affect perceived fairness of procedures. The addition of court appointed
testimony to these scenarios is likely to lower procedural justice evaluations even more.
Motive-Based Trust
An aspect related to procedural justice that is either included within the
procedural justice framework or considered complementary to it is motive-based trust.
Motive-based trust is the notion that people are more willing to accept decisions made
by authorities when they trust the motives of those authorities (Tyler & Huo, 2002). It
was hypothesized that as the plaintiff lost to defendants who possessed more power or
who could be more closely related to the court system itself, motive-based trust
judgments would decline. This was based on the rationale that neutral observers would
be less trusting of the motives of authorities when entities closer to those authorities had
a verdict in their favor. However, no significant findings supported this hypothesis, and
the best predictor of post-trial motive-based trust was pre-trial ratings of motive-based
trust (t(95)=5.544, p<.OOl). This finding is reassuring in the sense that losing a case to a
variety of defendant types with or without the presence of court appointed testimony
does not significantly affect judgments of motive-based trust. In a simple examination
of the means, motive-based trust evaluations were highest in the adversarial only
condition compared with court appointed conditions, but these results were not
4&>
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significant (t(95)=1.420, p=.159, n.s.). These lower means are consistent with the
procedural fairness findings and do weakly support a preference for adversarial
testimony over court appointed (see table 4.0).
The motive-based trust means in general are also lower than procedural fairness
ratings in a comparison of the mean tables (see 4.0 and 2.0), but statistical analyses
would need to be done to check for significance. Generally, motive-based trust
judgments post-trial fell in the 5.20 - 6.82 range, on a scale where 1 represents "No
Trust," 5 represents "Some Trust," and 9 represents "Complete Trust." Procedural
fairness ratings were in the 6.0 - 7.64 range on an identical scale measuring fairness
instead of trust. This trend of lower motive-based trust scores before and after the trial
experience suggest that, regardless of expert testimony present in the courtroom or the
type of defendant, legal authorities may want to take action to better themselves in the
eyes of the public. In the current sample, individuals rated that they only slightly more
than somewhat trust that legal authorities act in good faith - that is, with good
intentions. Improving the motive-based trust of authorities would playa role in
increasing procedural justice evaluations, as motive-based trust works hand in hand
with perceived fairness of decision making and quality of interpersonal treatment.
Limitations
The current study has a number of limitations that may help explain certain
findings and guide future directions of research. As a natural consequence of many
college campus based research studies, the research presented here focused on a
university sample comprised primarily of European Americans between the ages of 18
and 24. This brings to mind questions of personal experience with the legal system and
p'
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how such experience - or, more importantly, lack of experience - affects procedural
justice evaluations. The current sample underrepresents African Americans, which are
overrepresented in types of court proceedings. For example, an examination of
incarceration rate by state reveals that African Americans are six times more likely than
whites to be imprisoned (Sentencing Project, 2007). This is a problem because research
has shown that African Americans in particular are very likely to base future
cooperation with the legal system on judgments about whether the courts treat different
groups unfairly (Tyler, 2001). If this sample is composed of individuals who have had
limited experience with the legal system, due to age, race/ethnicity, or related forms of
privilege, the results might not be as generalizable to certain populations which have
had more direct experience with the legal system.
Previous research has suggested that those with prior court experience are
particularly concerned about quality of treatment, whereas those without experience
tend to focus on more abstract policy issues and their general confidence in the
government (Tyler, 2001; Olson & Huth, 1998). People who have experienced rude
treatment firsthand will place more weight on this aspect of procedural justice than
those who have not been in a similar position (Tyler, 2001). If there is more mistrust of
authorities and lower perceived fairness of proceedings and outcomes in populations
with excessive run-ins with the law, then the current results would underestimate the
impact of the use of court appointed experts. With perceived fairness of the legal system
at stake, and in result the perceived legitimacy of the system and willingness of
individuals to cooperate with legal authorities also at stake, demographic and
po
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experience-related limitations should be remedied in future research to address these
issues of generalizability.
A few technical issues with materials may also serve as limitations to the
presented results. In the trial transcripts, no cross-examination of the court appointed
expert witnesses was presented. The court appointed expert only fended questions from
the judge. This type of set-up is not true to actual trial proceedings and puts the court
appointed expert in a rather exclusive position. Adversarial expert witnesses are subject
to extensive cross-examination, a practice referred to as "the essential feature of
common law fact finding" (Gross, 1991, p.1165). The court appointed expert witness
was exempt from this practice in the transcripts, possibly giving his testimony a more
authoritarian slant, uniting him with the judge and, in turn, the body of court, and
ultimately resulting in lower procedural fairness ratings than the adversarial conditions.
If subjects prefer the adversarial methods of trial, this lack of cross-examination of the
expert witness sets him apart from the preferred methods, and may playa role in
explaining lower procedural fairness ratings with the introduction of such a witness.
Previous research has not presented court appointed expert witness testimony with the
opportunity for cross-examination nor has it presented such testimony in conjunction
with adversarial testimony. Future research addressing these issues will shed light on
the role cross-examination, when coupled with court appointed expert testimony, may
have on procedural justice judgments.
Conclusions
In general, the results of the current study followed the trends of the hypotheses.
Subjects rated procedural fairness higher when presented with only adversarial
po
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testimony compared with court appointed testimony, despite the fact that adversarial
experts were rated as more biased than court appointed experts. This continues the
pattern of problematic results in related psychological research involving expert witness
testimony, and is discouraging for the movement to increase the use of court appointed
experts as a way to increase procedural justice in the legal system.
Subjects rated procedural fairness lower when the plaintiff lost to a government
defendant than when the loss was to a corporate defendant. This stresses possible
associations people have between entities with high levels of power and the courtroom,
suggesting that fairness ratings may decline as plaintiffs lose to those whom they may
associate with the government system. This is a problem in cases where government
agencies or the State play the role of the defendant, and these scenarios may be
exacerbated with the presence of court appointed expert testimony.
The results found were from a sample of neutral observers, as the subjects were
to read the transcripts as though they were a neutral observer watching the courtroom
proceedings take place. Though there are some differences in elements of fairness
depending on whether an individual has personal experience with the legal system or
not (Tyler, 2001), the majority of individuals will not be in a situation where they are
involved in a case that goes to court. Therefore, having procedural justice evaluations
made by neutral observers allows for the greatest generalizability to the population. In
the recursive system of procedural justice and legitimacy, it is also important for
individuals to believe the legal system is fair and legitimate even if they have no
personal experience with the system. Therefore, when and if they do end up in a
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position where legal authorities may be called in, they are more willing to cooperate
with those authorities.
Though neutral observer fairness ratings tend to be higher than fairness ratings
of subjects role-playing the plaintiff (see Johnstone, 1996), it is important to recognize
that although subjects rated procedural fairness lower in certain conditions, those ratings
are not necessarily "low" in general. The scales provided allowed for ratings between 1
and 9, where 1 is "Not at all Fair," 9 is "Very Fair," and 5 is "Somewhat Fair." Means
ranged from 6.00 to 7.64 (see table 2.0), which suggests that subjects generally rated
procedural fairness for the experimental trial to be more than somewhat fair. Though it
is unknown whether a different sample would rate the trial at a comparable level of
fairness, or whether a different court case would receive similar ratings, it is
encouraging that the fairness ratings were relatively high. It may be that the benefits to
the legal system with the introduction of court appointed experts would ultimately
outweigh any drop to fairness ratings initially observed with the implementation of
more widespread use. This could especially be the case if the drop results in ratings that
are still "somewhat fair" or above.
There are numerous variables that may affect how fair people rate proceedings
in the courtroom, including the two explored in the current study - expert witness type
and role of the defendant. These fairness ratings in the courtroom reflect on the
perceived fairness of the legal system itself. Individuals who do not believe that trial
procedures are fair may generalize those ill feelings to the entire legal system. The
consequences of this include a lack of deterrence of future problems to proper legal
authorities, a lower level of cooperation with the legal system in general, and perhaps
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the breakdown of Tyler's (2003) self-regulating society. Results of the current study
suggest that neutral observers prefer the use of adversarial experts, and losses to
"powerful" entities such as government agencies will result in lower procedural fairness
ratings. Cases will always be tried where individuals lose to corporations or the
government, but the legal system should be particularly careful when introducing court
appointed testimony into these situations. More research needs to be done to determine
what manipulations, if any, allow for a greater acceptance of court appointed witness
testimony in the courtroom so as to maximize perceptions of fairness in the legal
system.
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Appendix A: Tables
Table 1.0. EXfJ£!!t Mean Bias Ratings
Court Appointed Expert
Variable Ind. Corp. Gov't
Adversarial
Adversarial Expert - Plaintiff Adversarial E~rt - Defense
Ind. Corp. .-:.G:;;.;o;:..:v'---'t=---_.::In;::d'-'--. Corp. Gov't
7.36 7.09 6.73 7.00 6.545 7.182
(1.433) (2.166) (2.005) (1.613) (1.753) (1.537)
Court 4.64 4.50 4.45 7.45 6.80 6.82 6.636 6.650 6.000
Appointed (1.912) (1.958) (1.968) (1.128) (1.135) (.874) (2.11 ) ( 1.765) (2.098)
Neutral
Court 6.18 5.50 5.36 6.73 7.60 6.18 6.909 6.600 6.636
Appointed (.874) (1.900) (1.963) ( 1.794) (1.265) (2.183) ( 1.70) (I.955) (2.292)
Biased
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. All variables were rated on 9 point scales with endpoints of 1 and 9_ Higher scores represent greater bias.
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Table 2.0. Procedural Fairness Mean Ratings
Corporation Government
7.64
(.674)
6.00
(1.789)
7.64
Individual
Court Appointed Neutral
Variable
Court Appointed Biased
Adversarial 7.45 7.36
(1.036) (1.433)
7.50 6.91
(1.080) (1.514)
7.30 6.00
__-------:-----,-------,---,------- ---->.(1.362) (.823) (2.324)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. All variables were rated on 9 point scales with endpoints
of 1 and 9. Higher scores represent higher procedural fairness.
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Table 3.0. Outcome Fairness Mean Ratings
Corporation Government
6.91 6.36
(2.427) (2.111)
7.30 6.55
(1.494) (1.968)
6.40 5.82
(1.753) (1.897) (2.750)
Individual
6.91
(.831 )
5.90
(2.514)
7.45
Variable
Court Appointed Neutral
Court Appointed Biased
Adversarial
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. All variables were rated on 9 point scales with endpoints
of 1 and 9. Higher scores represent higher outcome fairness.
-- -~- ~------- - --- - - ...--_._-.-------_... - - --------
--
----------
--------------------_._----
""
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Table 4.0. Motive-Based Trust Mean Ratings
Individual Corporation Government
6.36 6.18 6.82
(1.502) (1.328) (1.991)
Court Appointed Neutral 5.73 5.80 6.64
(2.284) (1.398) (1.362)
Court Appointed Biased 6.82 5.20 5.64
(1.722) (2.201) (1.567)
Adversarial
Variable
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. All variables were rated on 9 point scales with endpoints
of 1 and 9. Higher scores represent higher motive-based trust.
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Appendix B: Pre-Trial Questionnaire
Please take a moment to read over and thoughtfully answer the following questions.
1. In general, do you feel that the legal system is fair?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Not at all Fair Somewhat Very Fair
Fair
2. In general, do you feel that judges are fair?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Not at all Fair Somewhat Very Fair
Fair
3. Do you feel that society has respect for your views?
1
No Respect
2 3 4 5
Some
Respect
6 7 8 9
Complete Respect
4. Do you feel that the legal system has respect for your views?
1
No Respect
2 3 4 5
Some
Respect
6 7 8 9
Complete Respect
5. Do you feel that judges have respect for your views?
1
No Respect
2 3 4 5
Some
Respect
6 7 8 9
Complete Respect
6. In general, do you feel that the average citizen involved in a legal proceeding has the
capability to affect a trial's outcome?
1
No Ability
2 3 4 5
Some
Ability
6 7 8 9
Complete Ability
------------------ ------------ --------------- - -- --- -------
7. In general, do you feel that trial proceedings are fair?
1
Not at all Fair
2 3 4 5
Somewhat
Fair
6 7 8 9
Very Fair
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8. In general, do you feel that the average citizen involved in a trial has control over the
proceedings at trial - that is, what evidence is presented, what arguments are made for
the individual's side, etc.?
1
No Control
2 3 4 5
Some
Control
6 7 8 9
Complete Control
9. Do you feel that the legal system ought to make decisions in a consistent fashion?
1
Definitely No
2 3 4 5
No
Opinion
6 7 8 9
Definitely Yes
1O. Do you feel that everyone - even a serial murderer, rapist, or terrorist - has a right
to have his or her arguments heard at trial?
1
Definitely No
2 3 4 5
No
Opinion
6 7 8 9
Definitely Yes
11. Do you feel that everyone - even a serial murderer, rapist, or terrorist - should have
an equal chance of success at trial?
123456789
Definitely No No
Opinion
Definitely Yes
12. Do you feel that the methods used in a trial are unbiased (equally fair to both sides)
or biased (favor one side over another)?
Neither
Biased Nor Unbiased
1 2
Defmitely Unbiased
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Definitely Biased
13. In general, do you trust that legal authorities, such as law enforcement officers and
judges, act in good faith - that is, with good intentions?
No Trust
2 3 4 5
Some
Trust
6 7 8 9
Complete Trust
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Appendix C: Post-Trial Questionnaire
Please take a moment to read over and thoughtfully answer the following questions.
Remember that you are answering these questions from the viewpoint of a neutral
observer who watched the trial proceedings described in the transcript. Please answer
the questions as though you actually observed the trial taking place.
Section 1
1. On the whole, do you feel that the legal system is fair?
1
Not at all Fair
2 3 4 5
Somewhat
Fair
6 7 8 9
Very Fair
2. Do you feel that the trial procedure (i.e. what evidence was presenting, the order in
which it was presented, any rulings made by the judge, etc.) that led to the verdict in
this case was fair?
1
Not at all Fair
2 3 4 5
Somewhat
Fair
6 7 8 9
Very Fair
3. Do you feel that the actual verdict in this case was fair?
1
Not at all Fair
2 3 4 5
Somewhat
Fair
6 7 8 9
Very Fair
4. Did you feel that the plaintiff, Sgt. Patricia Longman, had control over the
proceedings at trial?
1
No Control
2 3 4 5
Some
Control
6 7 8 9
Complete Control
5. Were the methods used at trial biased towards one side, or were they equally fair to
both sides?
Neither
Biased Nor Unbiased
1 2
Definitely Unbiased
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Definitely Biased
6. On the whole, do you think the plaintiff feels frustrated with the trial proceedings?
1
Not at all Frustrated
2 3 4 5
Somewhat
Frustrated
6 7 8 9
Very Frustrated
pc
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7. On the whole, how hard did you feel the judge tried to be fair to the plaintiff?
1
Did NotTI)'
2 3 4 5 6
Tried
Somewhat
7 8 9
Tried VeTy Hard
8. On the whole, how politely was the plaintiff treated at trial?
1
Not Politely
2 3 456
Somewhat
Politely
7 8 9
Vel)' Politely
9. After having observed the trial, do you feel that the legal system has respect for the
average citizen's (your) views?
1
No Respect
2 3 4 5
Some
Respect
6 7 8 9
Complete Respect
10. During the trial, did you feel that the judge had respect for the plaintiffs views?
No Respect
2 3 4 5
Some
Respect
6 7 8 9
Complete Respect
11. Did you feel that the plaintiff was able to have an effect on the outcome of the trial?
1
No Effect
2 3 4 5
Some
Effect
6 7 8 9
Strong Effect
12. Did you feel that the plaintiff s lawyer was able to have an effect on the outcome of
the trial?
1
No Effect
2 3 4 5
Some
Effect
6 7 8 9
Strong Effect
13. It is possible that the plaintiff may appeal the judge's verdict in this case. Given the
option, how likely do you think it is that the plaintiff would appeal the decision?
1
Vel)' Unlikely
2 3 456
Somewhat
Likely
7 8 9
Vel)' Likely
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14. After having observed the trial, do you trust that legal authorities, such as law
enforcement officers and judges, act in good faith - that is, with good intentions?
No Trust
1 2 3 4 5
Some
Trust
6 7 8 9
Complete Trust
15. How likely do you think it is that the plaintiff would defer future problems to legal
authorities?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Very Unlikely Somewhat Very Likely
Likely
16. How happy are you with the verdict of the trial?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Very Unhappy Somewhat Very Happy
Happy
Section 2
1. How competent was the judge, Judge Leonard, in this case?
1
Very Incompetent
2 3 4 5
Average
Competence
6 7 8 9
Very Competent
2. On the whole, how fair was the judge in arriving at his decision?
1
Not at all Fair
2 3 4 5
Somewhat
Fair
6 7 8 9
Very Fair
3. How competent was Dr. Jae Yang, the plaintiffs expert witness, in this case?
1
Very Incompetent
2 3 4 5
Average
Competence
6 7 8 9
Very Competent
4. How convincing was the testimony of Dr. Yang?
1
Very Unconvincing
2 3 4 5
Not convincing
Nor unconvincing
6 7 8 9
Very Convincing
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5. How much influence did Dr. Yang have on the verdict of the judge?
1
No Influence
2 3 4 5
Some
Influence
6 7 8 9
Strong Influence
6. Do you think that Dr. Yang was biased (favored one side over the other) or unbiased
(neutral)?
Neither
Biased Nor Unbiased
1
Definitely Unbiased
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Definitely Biased
7. Do you believe that Dr. Yang testified with good intentions?
1
Strongly Disagree
2 3 4 5
Neither Agree
Nor Disagree
6 7 8 9
Strongly Agree
8. How competent was Dr. Kathy Johnson, the defendant's expert witness, in this case?
1 2
Very Incompetent
3 4 5 6
Average
Competence
7 8 9
Very Competent
9. How convincing was the testimony of Dr. Johnson?
1
Very Unconvincing
2 3 4 5
Not wnvincing
Nor unconvincing
6 7 8 9
Very Convincing
10. How much influence did Dr. Johnson have on the verdict of the judge?
1
No Influence
2 3 4 5
Some
Influence
6 7 8 9
Strong Influence
11. Do you think that Dr. Johnson was biased (favored one side over the other) or
unbiased (neutral)?
Neither
Biased Nor Unbiased
1 2
Definitely Unbiased
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Defin itely Biased
12. Do you believe that Dr. Johnson testified with good intentions?
1
Strongly Disagree
2 3 4 5
Neither Agree
Nor Disagree
6 7 8 9
Strongly Agree
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13. How competent was Dr. James Graham, the court appointed expert witness, in this
case?
1
Very Incompetent
2 3 4 5
Average
Competence
6 7 8 9
Very Competent
14. How convincing was the testimony of Dr. Graham?
1
Very Unconvincing
2 3 4 5
Not convincing
Nor unconvincing
6 7 8 9
Very Convincing
15. How much influence did Dr. Graham have on the verdict of the judge?
1
No Influence
2 3 4 5
Some
Influence
6 7 8 9
Strong Influence
16. Do you think that Dr. Graham was biased (favored one side over the other) or
unbiased (neutral)?
Neither
Biased Nor Unbiased
1
DefinitelY Unbiased
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Definitely Biased
17. Do you believe that Dr. Graham testified with good intentions?
1
Strongly Disagree
2 3 4 5
Neither Agree
Nor Disagree
6 7 8 9
Strongly Agree
18. How competent was the attorney for the plaintiff?
1
Very Incompetent
2 3 4 5
Average
Competence
6 7 8 9
Very Competent
19. How convincing were the arguments of the attorney for the plaintiff?
1
Very Unconvincing
2 3 4 5
Not convincing
Nor unconvincing
6 7 8 9
Very Convincing
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20. How much influence did the attorney for the plaintiff have on the judge's
verdict?
1
No Influence
2 3 4 5
Some
Influence
6 7 8 9
Strong Influence
21. On the whole, do you feel that the attorney for the plaintiff was fair?
1
Not at all Fair
2 3 4 5
Somewhat
Fair
6 7 8 9
Very Fair
22. How competent was the attorney for the defense?
1
Very Incompetent
2 3 4 5
Average
Competence
6 7 8 9
Very Competent
23. How convincing were the arguments of the attorney for the defense?
1
Very Unconvincing
2 3 4 5
Not convincing
Nor unconvincing
6 7 8 9
Very Convincing
24. How much influence did the attorney for the defense have on the judge's verdict?
No Influence
2 3 4 5
Some
Influence
6 7 8 9
Strong Influence
25. On the whole, do you feel that the attorney for the defense was fair?
....
1
Not at all Fair
2 3 4 5
Somewhat
Fair
6 7 8 9
Very Fair
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Appendix D: Trial Transcript
PATRICIA LONGMAN
vs.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MILITARY HEALTH SERVICES
ENCLOSED IS A CASE FILE SUMMARIZING THE EVENTS SURROUNDING
THE TRIAL OF LONGMAN V. US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MILITARY
HEALTH SERVICES. READ THE CONTENTS OF THE CASE FILE CAREFULLY.
REMEMBER, YOUR TASK IS TO READ AND REACT TO THE EVENTS AT
TRIAL AS THOUGH YOU WERE A NEWSPAPER REPORTER OBSERVING THE
TRIAL.
T
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Case Overview
Longman v. United States Department of Defense Military Health Services
Patricia Longman suffered a near-fatal heart attack on October 10th , 2004. She
was in her horne when the heart attack occurred, and her husband called an ambulance,
which transported her to her hometown hospital. She had been taking the prescription
drug Navoprex at a high dose for ten months to treat rheumatoid arthritis, an
autoimmune disease in which the body's immune system attacks the joints. This disease
resulted in her honorable discharge from the Army. Once at the hospital, the emergency
room staff of doctors suggested that she discontinue the Navoprex immediately to
decrease the chance of further heart attacks. Sgt. Longman has reason to believe that a
prescription of Navoprex without regard to her medical history may have caused her
heart attack due to the drug's promotion of clotting in the body, and has named the
United States Department of Defense Military Health Services, her government
healthcare agency, as the defendant.
...... I
-------
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Opening Statement of William Jeffreys,
Attorney for Plaintiff Patricia Longman
Judge Leonard: Does the Counsel for the Plaintiff wish to make any opening remarks?
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Yes, your honor. Counsel for the Defense, Judge Leonard,
good afternoon. I would like to start with some background information
necessary to understand the entirety of the tragedy that has befallen my client,
Sgt. Patricia Longman. Patricia Longman is a very health-conscious and hard-
working woman who never smoked, eats well, and has kept to a strict regimen
of physical training since her days in the Army. She is an unlikely candidate for
a heart attack at this age. A number of years ago, Sgt. Longman was diagnosed
with the painful and life-altering condition of rheumatoid arthritis. Because of
her medical condition, she was forced to leave the Army, a career that she loved.
The treatment recommended to her at the time was the prescription drug
Navoprex. Due to the severity of her condition, the United States Department of
Defense Military Health Services put Sgt. Longman on a high dose. Over time,
Sgt. Longman's rheumatoid arthritis interfered with her life less and less, which
she took as a sign that Navoprex was doing its job and made sure to take her
medication exactly as prescribed.
Unfortunately, Sgt. Longman had no way of knowing that Navoprex was
also increasing the chances of blood clots, which can lead to heart attacks and
strokes. Had Sgt. Longman not had a history of angina chest pain, which is often
a product of heart disease, a regimen ofNavoprex could have been an
appropriate prescription. However, the United States Department of Defense
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Military Health Services neglected to consider this critical aspect of her
medical history, and went ahead with the Navoprex prescription. Government
healthcare agencies are responsible for considering all available information and
making an informed decision. Sgt. Longman, trusting the recommendation of
her government healthcare agency, agreed to begin taking Navoprex unaware of
the increased risk due to her angina. The negligence by the United States
Department of Defense Military Health Services has resulted in what could have
been a fatal heart attack.
A government healthcare agency following the standard of practice in
the field would not have prescribed a drug that would promote clotting to a
patient suffering from angina. During the trial, you will hear expert medical
testimony that will demonstrate that the United States Department of Defense
Military Health Services was negligent and is therefore liable for the requested
damages of $1,200,000.
..
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Opening Statement of Joshua Banks,
Attorney for the Defendant, United States Department of Defense Military Health
Services
Judge Leonard: Does the Counsel for the Defense wish to make any opening remarks?
Counsel for the Defense: Yes, you honor, may it please the Court. The United States
Department of Defense Military Health Services would like to express its moral
support and concern for Sgt. Longman, in response to the heart attack that
occurred. Heart attacks strike many people every day. There is no doubt that
such a life-threatening event results in the urge to point fingers, to find someone
to blame. However, we will make it clear over the course of this trial that the
United States Department of Defense Military Health Services is not to blame.
The United States Department of Defense Military Health Services followed
standard medical practices and provided Sgt. Longman with high quality
medical care.
Navoprex underwent extensive clinical testing and was ultimately
deemed safe by not only the producer of the drug, Entco Pharmaceuticals, but
the FDA as well. Doctors across the United States commend the drug for the
significant improvement it makes in the lives of those suffering from rheumatoid
arthritis. The available evidence suggests that the increase in the risk of heart
attack from Navoprex is small, and this risk can be justified by the marked
improvement observed in the conditions of patients who take the drug.
The United States Department of Defense Military Health Services
adequately took Sgt. Longman's medical history into account before
recommending a drug. There is no published research stating that the use of
--
•
•
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Navoprex with patients suffering from angina places them at an unusually
high risk of heart attacks. The United States Department of Defense Military
Health Services carefully considered all aspects of the plaintiffs condition when
deciding on a treatment. Many government healthcare agencies prescribe
Navoprex and with much success in regard to patient improvement, so there is
no question that the prescription of the drug itself was appropriate.
We will present testimony that demonstrates that Navoprex is a safe
drug, even when prescribed to patients with possible heart problems. The United
States Department of Defense Military Health Services made an appropriate
choice of drug based on the information at hand. The United States Department
of Defense Military Health Services followed the standard of practice in the
field. It is not liable for the requested damages.
......
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Testimony of the Medical Experts
Day]
Judge Leonard: I would like to begin by calling a court-appointed expert witness to the
stand, Dr. James Graham of the FDA's Office of Drug Safety. (Dr. Graham is
seated and sworn in). Dr. James Graham, could you please state your name and
occupation for the Court?
Dr. Graham, Court Appointed Witness: Dr. James Graham, Associate Director for
Science and Medicine in the Food and Drug Administration's Office of Drug
Safety.
Judge Leonard: Where did you obtain your degree?
Dr. Graham, Court Appointed Witness: I graduated from the John Hopkins
University School of Medicine, where I completed a fellowship in
pharmacoepidemiology and my Masters in Public Health. I've also trained in
Internal Medicine at Yale and Adult Neurology at the University of
Pennsylvania.
Judge Leonard: Could you briefly explain to the Court what pharmacoepidemiology
is?
Dr. Graham, Court Appointed Witness: Pharmacoepidemiology is the study of the
use and effect of drugs in a population. It involves determining the existence and
extent of risks associated with drugs, and working to improve the quality and
use of medications.
Judge Leonard: Dr. Graham, are you familiar with the medicine marketed under the
name Navoprex?
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Dr. Graham, Court Appointed Witness: I am.
Judge Leonard: Dr. Graham, would you explain how Navoprex works?
Dr. Graham, Court Appointed Witness: The important human enzymes related to this
case are COX-l and COX-2. COX-l is necessary for the normal functioning of
the stomach and platelets, whereas COX-2 is responsible for pain and swelling,
much like what is experienced with rheumatoid arthritis. Over the counter drugs
like Ibuprofen inhibit COX-l and COX-2, meaning they are effective in
reducing pain but in turn increase the risk of stomach bleeding. Drugs like
Navoprex inhibit only COX-2, reducing pain without the side effects caused by
inhibiting COX-I.
Judge Leonard: And would you explain what the body undergoes during a heart
attack?
Dr. Graham, Court Appointed Witness: Under normal circumstances, a balance
between clotting factors and factors that prevent clotting maintain the flow of
blood in one's body. In a myocardial infarction - a heart attack - or in a stroke,
a blood clot forms, often at the site of an injury, in a vessel that brings oxygen
and nutrients to the heart or brain. When the flow of blood is stopped by the clot,
a part of the heart or brain is injured or dies.
Judge Leonard: Thank you for your testimony, Dr. Graham. I have no further
questions at this time, but. I will reserve the right to recall this witness (Dr.
Graham removes himself from the stand). Does the plaintiff wish to call any
witnesses at this time?
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Counsel for the Plaintiff: Yes, your honor. The plaintiff would like to call Dr. Jae
Yang, to the stand. (Dr. Yang is seated and sworn in). Dr. Yang, would you
please state your name and occupation for the Court?
Dr. Yang, Witness for the Plaintiff: Dr. Yang, Adjunct Clinical Professor of Medicine
at the Stanford University School of Medicine in Stanford, California, and a
Chief Science Officer at the Institute of Clinical Outcomes Research and
Education in Woodside, California.
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Dr, Yang, where did you obtain your degree?
Dr. Yang, Witness for the Plaintiff: I graduated from Harvard University and trained
as a rheumatologist with concentrations in safety and epidemiology.
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Would you clarify for the Court what a rheumatologist does?
Dr. Yang, Witness for the Plaintiff: A rheumatologist diagnoses and treats rheumatoid
diseases, which are mainly problems involving joints and related connective
tissues.
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Are you familiar with the case of Patricia Longman?
Dr. Yang, Witness for the Plaintiff: Yes I am. I examined her on October 11 th, 2004.
Counsel for the Plaintiff: What did you find during your examination?
Dr. Yang, Witness for the Plaintiff: I determined that Sgt. Longman had suffered a
myocardial infarction.
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Was Sgt. Longman taking any medications at the time?
Dr. Yang, Witness for the Plaintiff: Yes, she was taking a high-dose prescription of
Navoprex and had been doing so consistently for 10 months.
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Counsel for the Plaintiff: Is there any connection between her high-dose
prescription of Navoprex and the subsequent heart attack?
Dr. Yang, Witness for the Plaintiff: Yes. It is very probable that Navoprex is at least
partially to blame for the attack, due to the patient's history of angina.
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Would you explain to the Court what angina is?
Dr. Yang, Witness for the Plaintiff: Certainly. Angina is chest pain that results when
part of the heart is not getting enough oxygen-rich blood. It is often a symptom
of an underlying condition such as coronary artery disease or other types of
heart disease.
Counsel for the Plaintiff: What evidence did you use to make the determination that
Navoprex is at least partially to blame for the heart attack?
Dr. Yang, Witness for the Plaintiff: Unlike Aspirin, which prevents platelets from
clumping, Navoprex is believed to promote clotting and thus increase the risk of
myocardial infarctions. Considering that Sgt. Longman had a clear medical
history of angina, Navoprex might have further promoted clotting in a body
already at risk for clots and ultimately heart attacks.
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Have any clinical studies been done that demonstrate the
increased risk?
Dr. Yang, Witness for the Plaintiff: Yes, numerous studies have shown just that. Two
studies done by Entco Pharmaceuticals, 090 and 095, have found nearly a 7-fold
and 5-fold increase, respectively, in increased heart attack risk with high doses
of Navoprex.
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Counsel for the Plaintiff: And is it correct that Sgt. Longman was on a dosage that
fell into the "high dose" range for Navoprex?
Dr. Yang, Witness for the Plaintiff: That is correct.
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Would a reasonably prudent physician following the
standard of practice in the field prescribe a drug shown to promote clotting, such
as Navoprex, in a high dose to a patient suffering from angina?
Dr. Yang, Witness for the Plaintiff: No. The risk of stroke and heart attacks would
most certainly outweigh the benefits of a high dose treatment.
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Have any studies been done outside of the Entco Corporation
to evaluate the effects of Navoprex?
Dr. Yang, Witness for the Plaintiff: A study funded by Kaiser Permanente that took
three years to complete concluded that high dose prescriptions ofNavoprex
should not be given due to high risk of heart attack and sudden death. The
authors estimated that nearly 28,000 excess cases of heart attack or sudden
cardiac death were caused by Navoprex. This is a conservative estimate.
Counsel for the Plaintiff: No further questions, your Honor.
Judge Leonard: Counsel for the Defense, would you like to cross-examine this
witness?
Counsel for the Defense: Yes, thank you, your Honor. Dr. Yang, can you state with
absolute certainty that the heart attack suffered by Sgt. Longman was caused by
Navoprex?
Dr. Yang, Witness for the Plaintiff: In the medical field doctors are often unable to be
absolutely certain as to a single cause of -
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Counsel for the Defense: A simple yes or no will suffice, Dr. Yang.
Dr. Yang, Witness for the Plaintiff: No, I cannot be absolutely certain.
Counsel for the Defense: And despite these clinical studies of which you speak, the
FDA still chose to approve Navoprex for the market?
Dr. Yang, Witness for the Plaintiff: Well, yes, but the short-term studies by Entco
were not adequate to evaluate the long-term effects of -.
Counsel for the Defense: And these studies did not evaluate the effects ofNavoprex on
patients with angina, is that correct?
Dr. Yang, Witness for the Plaintiff: That is correct. It would be unethical to·-
Counsel for the Defense: Thank you, Dr. Yang. No further questions.
Judge Leonard: If there are no further questions for Dr. Yang, this court is adjourned
until tomorrow morning.
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Day 2
Judge Leonard: I would like to recall yesterday's court-appointed witness, Dr. Graham
(Dr. Graham is seated and sworn in). Dr. Graham, would you please restate your
name and occupation for the Court?
Dr. Graham, Court Appointed Witness: Dr. James Graham, Associate Director for
Science and Medicine in the Food and Drug Administration's Office of Drug
Safety.
Judge Leonard: Are you familiar with the clinical trials that were published in regard
to Navoprex and the risk of heart attack?
Dr. Graham, Court Appointed Witness: Yes, your honor, I am. In fact, in what I
would consider one of the most comprehensive studies in regard to this issue,
researchers found in 2002 that a high dose of Navoprex resulted in only a 2-fold
increase in heart attack risk compared with no increased risk for the control.
Judge Leonard: Thank you for your testimony Dr. Graham. No further questions (Dr.
Graham removes himself from the stand). Counsel for the Defense, will you be
calling any witnesses at this time?
Counsel for the Defense: Yes, your Honor, thank you. We would like to call our expert
witness, Dr. Kathy Johnson. (Dr. Johnson is seated and sworn in). Dr. Johnson,
could you please state your name and occupation for the Court?
Dr. Johnson, Witness for the Defense: Dr. Kathy Johnson, Co-Director of the
Cardiovascular Health Research Unit at the University of Seattle in Washington.
Counsel for the Defense: Where did you receive your medical training?
r=
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Dr. Johnson, 'Vitness for the Defense: I graduated from Kansas State University
Medical School, where I trained in pharmacoepidemiology and cardiovascular
health.
Counsel for the Defense: Are you familiar with the studies cited by Dr. Yang?
Dr. Johnson, Witness for the Defense: I am familiar with the published data regarding
Navoprex, including the 2002 meta-study that Dr. Yang neglected to mention,
but that Dr. Graham brought up in his testimony.
Counsel for the Defense: Would you explain to the court the results of this particular
study?
Dr. Johnson, Witness for the Defense: The results were exactly how Dr. Graham
described them, and the increase in risk was hardly statistically significant.
Counsel for the Defense: What did the FDA do with this information?
Dr..Johnson, Witness for the Defense: The FDA had previously stated that, "With the
available data, it is impossible to answer with complete certainty whether the
risk of cardiovascular and thromboembolic events is increased in patients on
Navoprex. A larger database will be needed to answer this and other safety
comparison questions." This meta-study provided the "larger database"
requested by the FDA, with the result being the approval ofNavoprex for use by
millions of patients.
Counsel for the Defense: Is it true that the FDA took these studies about heart attack
risk into account when opting to approve Navoprex?
Dr. Johnson, Witness for the Defense: Yes.
T'
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Counsel for the Defense: Taking into account the clinical studies and actions of the
FDA, what is your expert opinion about the cause of Sgt Longman's heart
attack?
Dr. Johnson, Witness for the Defense: It is clear to me that the risks of Navoprex are
minimal and that the heart attack suffered by Sgt. Longman, though naturally
very tragic, cannot solely be blamed on the prescription of Navoprex, even in
conjunction with her angina.
Counsel for the Defense: Would you say that many physicians prescribe Navoprex at a
high dosage to patients?
Dr. Johnson, Witness for the Defense: I would say that it's a fairly regular occurrence,
yes.
Counsel for the Defense: Would a reasonable physician have prescribed Navoprex to
Sgt. Longman at a high dosage, as the defendant did?
Dr. Johnson, Witness for the Defense: I wouldn't hesitate to do it myself.
Counsel for the Defense: Thank you, Dr. Johnson. No further questions.
Judge Leonard: Counsel for the Plaintiff, would you like to cross-examine the witness
at this time?
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Yes, your honor, thank you. Dr. Johnson, you said that the
results of the meta-study were "hardly statistically significant." "Hardly"
statistically significant is still statistically significant, isn't that correct?
Dr. Johnson, Witness for the Defense: Yes, but-
Counsel for the Plaintiff: And would you please define "statistically significant" for
the Court, Dr. Johnson.
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Dr. Johnson, Witness for the Defense: Statistically significant is a way to describe
results of a controlled study as very unlikely to have occurred just by chance,
though there is naturally a margin of error -
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Therefore, the results of the meta-study suggesting that hemi
attacks increased 2-fold for high dose Navoprex patients were extremely
unlikely to have occurred by chance, is that correct?
Dr. Johnson, Witness for the Defense: Yes.
Counsel for the Plaintiff: No further questions, your honor.
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Closing Statement of William Jeffreys,
Attorney for Plaintiff Patricia Longman
Judge Leonard: Would the Counsel for the Plaintiff like to make a closing statement at
this time?
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Yes, thank you your Honor. Though there is no way to prove
with 100% certainty that Navoprex caused Patricia Longman's heart attack, it is
reasonable to conclude that Navoprex played a significant role. The most
comprehensive study done strongly concluded that Navoprex does increase the
risk of heart attacks and sudden death and explicitly stated that the drug should
not be prescribed. This three year long study was exactly what the FDA called
for as an appropriate follow-up to the studies by Entco Pharmaceuticals, which,
mind you, also relatively consistently showed an increase risk in heart attacks
for those taking a high dose of the drug. Government healthcare agencies have a
professional responsibility to be adequately informed about the medications that
they prescribe. Reasonably competent government healthcare agencies would
have studied these results before prescribing this medication. We don't know
whether the United States Department of Defense Military Health Services knew
of this research, but if it did not, it should have. The United States Department
of Defense Military Health Services certainly knew of Sgt. Longman's angina.
She reported it to the government healthcare agency and the United States
Department of Defense Military Health Services noted the report in her medical
records. Any competent government healthcare agency would know that angina
is a symptom of cardiovascular problems. No reasonable government healthcare
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agency would prescribe a high dose of a medication known to cause heart
attacks to a patient suspected of having cardiovascular problems.
The evidence is clear. The United States Department of Defense Military
Health Services did not act as we expect reasonably competent government
healthcare agencies to act. It did not act according to the standards of practice of
the profession. It is therefore liable for the trauma that it caused to Sgt.
Longman and for the continuing loss of quality of life that she suffers. I urge
you to find in favor of Sgt. Longman and award her the requested amount of $
1,200,000. Thank you.
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Closing Statement of Joshua Banks,
Attorney for the Defendant, United States Department of Defense Military HeaJth
Services
Judge Leonard: Would the Counsel for the Defense like to make a closing statement?
Counsel for the Defense: Yes. Thank you your honor. There is no doubt that something
terrible happened to Sgt. Longman. Both rheumatoid arthritis and the heart
attack have been painful, frightening, and life-altering experiences for the
plaintiff. But this case is not about that. And it is not about whether Navoprex
increases the risk of heart attacks. And it is not about whether the United States
Department of Defense Military Health Services could have decided upon a
different course of treatment. Government healthcare agencies must make
difficult decisions every day. Sometimes the results of those decisions aren't
what we or the government healthcare agency would hope for. But we don't
hold government healthcare agencies responsible for the outcomes. For the
plaintiffs to prevail in this case, they must demonstrate that the United States
Department of Defense Military Health Services did something wrong and the
evidence simply does not support this conclusion.
There is no direct evidence that Navoprex caused the plaintiffs heart
attack. There are other factors that could have caused the heart attack and the
plaintiff has not ruled these out. Furthermore, Navoprex was approved for use
by the Food and Drug Administration after undergoing thorough tests. Although
there is some evidence for a slight increase in the risk of heart attacks after
taking Navoprex, thousands of physicians have prescribed this medication to
hundreds of thousands of patients. Clearly, reasonably competent government
"'f
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healthcare agencies do make the decision to prescribe Navoprex and they
make this decision frequently. Furthermore, no study has concluded that
Navoprex should not be prescribed to patients reporting angina and other than
the report of angina, there was no reason to believe that the plaintiff could have
been unusually susceptible to Navoprex.
In sum, the United States Department of Defense Military Health
Services acted in accordance with the best standards of the profession. It made a
reasonable decision based on the evidence available. We are truly sorry for the
injury and pain that the plaintiff has suffered, but the United States Department
of Defense Military Health Services is not responsible for it. The evidence is
clear. The United States Department of Defense Military Health Services is not
liable.
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Verdict of Judge Leonard
Judge Leonard: I have considered the arguments of both counsel, as well as the
testimony of the medical experts in this case. Let me again reiterate my sorrow,
Sgt. Longman that you have had to deal with not only rheumatoid arthritis, but a
recent heart attack as well. The plaintiff in this case has argued that the United
States Department of Defense Military Health Services is to blame for this heart
attack, because it disregarded relevant medical history and negligently
prescribed a medication that by itself or in conjunction with conditions
underlying the reported angina, led to the plaintiffs heart attack. While this
argument is compelling due to the tragic nature of the current situation, I agree
with the defendant that there is no definitive proof that Navoprex either
exasperated Sgt. Longman's condition to the point of cardiac arrest or caused
the attack in some other way.
Though studies did seem to show that Navoprex might increase the risk
of heart attack, a lack of consensus on the extent of this risk made it so I could
not rule against the defendant on these particular issues. It is simply not clear to
me that a reasonably competent government healthcare agency applying the best
standards of practice would not have advocated the same course of treatment as
did the defendant.
Therefore, I hold for the defendant, the United States Department of
Defense Military Health Services.
T-
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